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ABSTRACT

The authors examine the role of the school desegregation monitor and various types of monitoring bodies as a special case of the broader phenomenon of community conflict intervention. Monitoring school desegregation is defined as a process in which designated individuals collect data on a school system (through observation, documents, and interviews), analyze and evaluate the data, and report to an authorizing body on the content and quality of the system's efforts to comply with that body's standards for desegregation. The paper discusses monitoring as a technique for intervention in community conflict, delineates advantages and disadvantages of several types of monitoring, and examines monitoring activities in two school systems, one urban and one suburban. Implications for social policy and intervention strategies are discussed. (Author/MK)

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INTERVENING IN SCHOOL DESEGREGATION CONFLICTS: THE ROLE OF THE MONITOR

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I. INTRODUCTION

Dramatic societal changes and the creation of new social roles often result from intensive conflict in communities and institutions. The emergence of a range of conflict intervention roles -- including the school desegregation monitor -- is one important societal response to the conflict and social movements of the 1960's and 1970's.

In this paper the authors examine the role of the school desegregation monitor and various types of monitoring bodies as a special case of the broader phenomenon of community conflict intervention, a field which has developed formally during the last two decades. Monitoring structures and behavior are analyzed in the light of one of the major ongoing social conflict issues facing United States society -- school desegregation. [1]

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Monitoring is viewed as a process whose manifest goals are to gather data, analyze, evaluate, and communicate findings regarding the extent of a school system's compliance with a desegregation order, and whose latent functions may include advocacy, mediation, and enforcement. Monitoring bodies and monitors also may play critical roles in determining whether court-ordered (or, in rare cases, "voluntary") school desegregation is implemented and receives broad community acceptance, or whether it remains a paper policy which never finally impacts educational institutions and their racial practices.

The aims of this paper, then, are: (a) to present an emergent model for understanding school desegregation monitoring as a type of conflict intervention, (b) to assess relevant dimensions of four different types of monitoring and develop criteria for "effective" or "successful" monitoring, (c) to empirically examine monitoring activities in two school districts, and (d) to discuss the implications for school desegregation policy in the United States and for strategies of conflict intervention.

Following the introduction, section II contains definitions of the major terms of the analysis: school desegregation, conflict intervention, and monitoring. Section III examines in more detail the sociological dimensions of monitoring and develops a typology of monitoring as an intervention strategy. In section IV desegregation and monitoring activities in the St. Louis Public Schools in the Ferguson-Florissant Reorganized School District in St. Louis County are analyzed, followed by

a concluding section on implications for social policy and intervention strategies.

II. DEFINITIONS AND PERSPECTIVES: SCHOOL DESEGREGATION, CONFLICT INTERVENTION, MONITORING

A. A Sociological Approach to School Desegregation

Social scientists have approached the study of school desegregation from a variety of perspectives, among them human relations, ethnographic, social psychological, organizational development, social movements, law-and-society, political sociology, social change, diffusion of innovations, conflict management, and complex organizations (see Coleman et al 1966, Crain et al 1968, Foster 1973, Kirby 1973, St. John 1975, Weinberg 1975, Pettigrew and Green 1976, Kirp 1977, Monti and Laue 1977, Orfield 1978, Ross and Berg 1978, Crain and Mahard 1979, Wilkinson 1979, Monti 1979a).

Our perspective is primarily that of the political sociologist. We focus on school desegregation as a complex process involving the struggle of various interest groups (boards of education, school administrators and staff, white and minority students and parents, government agencies, and community leaders, for example) for control of the resources and the resource-allocation process in school systems which are facing the issues of discrimination and segregation.

Desegregation usually becomes an issue in school systems where a significant number of schools are racially or ethnically identifiable. In a purely technical sense, school desegregation may be defined as actions taken by a school system, either voluntarily or under order of a court or direction

of an agency, to reduce or eliminate racial or ethnic separation in the system's schools. The impact of these actions on the everyday lives of students and parents (and their friends and relatives) and in a wide range of community interest groups gives school desegregation a high salience for all segments of the community.

The school desegregation process has three analytically distinct stages, which we have labeled the Decision to Desegregate, Formulation of a Desegregation Plan, and Implementation of the Plan. The issues, the actors, and the ensuing conflicts vary at each stage -- as do the intervention techniques applied.

Stage 1 -- The Decision to Desegregate. This stage encompasses all activity up to and including the actual decision that the school district(s) involved will undergo some form of desegregation -- whether the decision is the result of litigation or some less formal process. Stage 1 is among the most highly politicized phases, for until the final decision is made, the major activity of the parties is to use their power to achieve a formal decision that is perceived to be of greatest benefit to their interests.

Often parent groups file suit in an attempt to obtain redress for alleged violation of constitutional rights[2] and to "settle" some of the political questions raised at this stage, and the presence or absence of litigation often becomes the most important variable in determining the outcome of Stage 1. While litigation often is viewed as an alternative to the political process for arriving at crucial policy decisions, the

introduction of litigation into school desegregation cases can have the effect of more dramatically politicizing the process as the trial's proceedings provide daily media exposure on the issue.

The pre-Decision phase, then, is one of maneuvering for political advantage on the part of all the parties to desegregation -- school system, teachers, parents, advocate groups, city, state, and Federal agencies. Litigation makes the maneuvering more regularied, expensive, and adversarial, and virtually assures that the school system will not take immediate and forthright action on alleged segregative practices until the final legal appeal is exhausted. Litigation also is an extremely lengthy process, with six to eight years often elapsing from filing to final adjudication.[3]

Most monitoring activity at this stage is internal to the school system; the formal role of the monitor does not fully emerge until a later stage.

Stage 2 -- Formulation of a Desegregation Plan. Stage 2 of the school desegregation process formally begins when a school district and all the constituent parties have recognized the existence of a decision to desegregate and thus become involved both in formulating a plan to implement the decision and in making specific preparations to implement the plan. The plan-formulation process may be accomplished by one person (a judge, a master, an outside expert or a school district official, for example) or by many and diverse parties. It may be an open process to the community or it may be secretive, and it may have a short or long lead-time to implementation.

Recognition or acceptance that desegregation will occur is the critical cueing mechanism for Stage 2 in this framework, and the clarity and level of that recognition is a key to effective planning and, therefore, effective implementation. Unless there is broad community acceptance of the decision, conflict and perhaps violence will follow, and serious planning for implementation is not possible. The "massive resistance" movement in the South following the 1954 Supreme Court ruling is a primary example of the inability of the process to move from Stage 1 to Stage 2 if broad community acceptance is not present. Boston is a more recent and more relevant example: for more than a year following the formal decision by the courts to desegregate, official and vocal resistance existed in the school system and the city council -- and even the mayor's office was not willing to take an unequivocal stance in support of court-ordered desegregation. Therefore, planning for effective implementation was impossible, for efforts were still being directed to the macro-political activities of Stage 1.

Frequently one of the by-products of the desegregation process is the opening up of the school system to closer scrutiny by a number of persons and interest groups external to the system. This weakening of traditional system boundaries is a prerequisite to the emergence of the fully-legitimated role of the external monitor. During Stage 2 the many interest groups aroused in Stage 1 political activities often turn their attention to the planning process, and extend and regularize some of the activities begun in Stage 1 -- notably attending hearings

and committee meetings, taking notes, and reporting back to the constituency. Formal monitoring of the process of formulating the desegregation plan is a logical but little-used extension of these activities.

Stage 3 -- Implementation of the Plan. For analytical purposes, Stage 3 includes all those activities conducted in the school system and its communities in response to the decision to desegregate and the plan which is developed. This phase usually appears publicly with the start of classroom desegregation; in reality it often begins earlier with less visible administrative actions such as teacher and staff workshops or changes in budgets and tables of organization.

The implementation of any school desegregation plan has two major thrusts. One is primarily logistical and involves the operational changes a school system must make to implement the plan -- construction or remodeling of physical facilities, drawing transportation plans, changes in instructional materials, staff placement, and related activities.

The other primary component of the implementation phase is the political process through which the schools relate to parents, other concerned citizens, and students in developing and amending desegregation policies. It is at this stage that such mechanisms as a monitoring commission and/or a broadly-based citizens coalition typically come into play, although planning for their work may begin in Stages 1 and 2.

If monitors and other intervenors are to fulfill their role expectations effectively, they must understand the interplay

(a) between the technical decisions and political decisions alluded to above, and (b) between school system expertise (and the understandable urge to recapture the process for the inside administrators and experts) and community members' desire to control the conditions in which their children are to receive education.

All three stages -- Decision, Planning, and Implementation -- are highly politicized, with an ongoing struggle for control over the resources to be allocated in the public education of the community's children. During each of the three stages, different variables come into ascendancy, and they must be fully understood and dealt with by intervenors. In Stage 1, litigation often is the key variable predictive of the process toward decision. In Stage 2, the struggle for control of the planning process is a major dynamic. In Stage 3, the central question is the nature of the relationship between school system owners and managers and the system's clients and constituents -- again a struggle for control of the process and the outcomes.

B. The Emergence of Community Conflict Intervention

Monitoring is analyzed in this paper as an example of a community conflict intervention technique. The field of community conflict intervention has emerged formally in the last 20 years, largely in response to the racial, community, and service-delivery disputes that came into prominence during that period (see Burton 1969, Laue 1970, Chalmers and Cormick 1971, Kelman 1972, Nicolau and Cormick 1972, Deutsch 1973, Spiegel 1973, Chalmers 1974, Gant 1974, Goldaber and Porter 1974, Bartunek, Benton and Keys 1975, Likert and Likert 1976, Ford

Foundation 1978a, b, Laue 1978a, Laue and Cormick 1978, and Wehr 1979).

Community conflict intervention is the deliberate and systematic entering-in to a situation by an outside or semi-outside party or parties (persons or organizations) with the aim of influencing the direction or the outcome of the conflict in a way deemed desirable by the intervenor. All intervention alters the power configuration of the situation; therefore, all intervention is a form of advocacy -- whether for a particular party, outcome, or process of conflict resolution (Laue, 1978b).

All intervention activity starts with a goal -- or at least a conception on the part of the intervenor of the nature, causes, and desirable directions of the conflict. Merely by entering a conflict situation, an intervenor expresses a position. The strategies one pursues in conflict intervention are largely a result of the position the intervenor takes vis-à-vis the parties, the issues, and the values involved in the conflict. Neutrality is impossible, whether or not the intervenor feels neutral.

Laue and Cormick (1978) have analyzed community disputes and intervention, identifying five basic roles which are played individually or in combination by intervenors in all conflict situations: Activist, Advocate, Mediator, Researcher, and Enforcer. The roles are differentiated in terms of the intervenor's organizational and fiscal base, relationship to the parties, and skills.

Activist. Based in one of the parties actively in conflict and so strongly identified with that party that he or she is not able to emphathize, negotiate, or compromise with the other

party or parties. Skills generally include organizing, public speaking, strategizing, etc. A welfare mother leading a welfare rights protest is a good example. This type of intervenor may become so closely identified with the out-party that he or she must deal with the challenge "going native" presents to effective intervention. A counterpart, the Reactivist, is aligned with the more established party in community disputes.

Advocate. Works in behalf of an interest group in a conflict, and is supported either by that group or an independent, generally sympathetic source. Promotes the party's cause to wider constituencies, and may serve as a negotiator. Skills include those of the Activist in addition to the ability to envision and achieve conflict-termination on what the Advocate's party defines as good terms. Typical in-party Advocate is the management consultant, and typical out-party Advocate is the community organizer.

Mediator. Based in an advocacy for "good process" (participatory, jointly-determined, leading to win/win outcomes) rather than for any of the parties per se. Since mediation is a voluntary process, the mediator's fiscal and organizational base must be acceptable to all the parties. Skills include facilitation of negotiations, organizing, communicating, seeking additional resources, and packaging settlements.

Researcher. With an independent or semi-independent base, the Researcher may be a social scientist, policy analyst, media representative, lay observer, or monitor, whose role is to provide an independent description (and, if prescribed, evaluation)

of a given conflict situation. Observation, data-gathering, objectivity, writing, and oral communication are some of the requisite skills. The interests of the Researcher include the activities of each of the other parties described above as well as the ongoing dynamic of the conflict. Occupants of the Researcher intervention role often perceive themselves as neutral, but they alter the power configuration of the situation by their presence and may be used by parties on all sides to further their objectives.

Enforcer. With an independent power base, the Enforcer has the power to enforce conditions on conflicting parties irrespective of their wishes, often in the institutional form of a formal agency of social control of the larger system in which the conflict is set -- the courts, the police, a funding agency, or an arbitrator. The Enforcer brings formal coercive power to the situation; no other intervenor does. The Enforcer carries the right to specify behavior or impose sanctions which may support the goals of none, any, or all the parties.

Community conflicts are about resources (goods, services, jobs, facilities, land, etc.) and power (the control of decisions about the allocation of resources). Community conflict intervenors become part of this dynamic, and the base, background, and ideology of the intervenor is critical to the impact and direction of intervention.

There are a number of persons and organizations currently practicing community conflict intervention, among them human relations commissions, religious groups, government agencies at

all levels, individual professionals (including psychologists, sociologists, labor arbitrators, and lawyers), civil rights groups, and university research and training centers.[4]

C. Monitoring School Desegregation

One of the more recent conflict intervention roles to emerge is that of the school desegregation monitor. Formally and structurally, the monitor is a variant of the Researcher role described by Laue and Cormick. Monitoring school desegregation may be defined as a process in which designated individuals collect data on a school system (through observation, documents, and interviews), analyze and evaluate the data, and report to an authorizing body on the content and quality of the system's efforts to comply with that body's standards for desegregation.[5]

The characteristics and components of monitoring school desegregation may be further elaborated as follows:

1. Monitoring typically emerges as a well-defined and extensive activity during Stage 3 of the desegregation process -- Implementation. The task is to assess how well the system is complying with the desegregation plan, whether established by the court or voluntarily.

2. School systems continuously conduct a range of monitoring activities of their own performance in a number of areas, and organizations outside the system also may begin to monitor performance during the Decision or Planning stages. Formal monitoring often is an extension of activities in Stages 1 and 2.

3. The organizational or authorizing base of the monitoring activity may be the courts, a citizens' coalition (with or without a court sanction), the school system, federal or state agencies, or independent organizations (universities or private research centers, for example).

4. Monitoring bodies vary in their size, specific objectives, complement of professional staff, technical and research skills, longevity, and effectiveness.

The individual functioning as a monitor, then, carries a formal role description as a Researcher or observer. The major expected behaviors involve developing an objective and independent set of data against which the authorizing body can judge the school system's level of compliance with its standards. But circumstances -- and the monitoring organization's base and goals -- often thrust the monitor into the other three roles noted.

First, the monitor -- regardless of how neutral and objective the person may be in the exercise of his or her technical functions -- is, by definition, an Advocate for the standards of the authorizing body. Most typically this refers to the content of a given desegregation plan ordered or authorized by the courts. The monitor also is a process or procedural

advocate -- acting in behalf of certain established or to-be-established procedures in the system. While "neutrality" and "objectively" are important elements of the ideology of monitoring, the monitor clearly is not neutral in base or impact on the system -- and probably not in ideology regarding desegregation and the given plan.

The monitor functions as a Mediator in many contexts -- between court and school officials, between school officials and citizens, and within school system. With a mandate that permits the role occupant to range across normally restricted authority lines in the school system, the monitor quickly is identified as a message-carrier who can be used for clarification, buffering, intelligence-gathering, or problem-solving by the various parties. The monitor often is the first person outside the system to identify areas of trouble or noncompliance, and is in a position to quietly advocate internal remediation of the problem with the implied threat of utilizing the authorizing body's enforcement powers if compliance is not forthcoming.

It should be clear from this description of the monitor's base and functions that an occupant of this role also may carry implied powers as an Enforcer. While monitors themselves do not enforce the law or other standards, there are a number of ways they can influence or direct enforcement: by the problems they choose to highlight and study in the school system, by the ways they report observations to the authorizing body, and through their informal networks and relationships with the court,

federal and state agencies, and various community power structures.

Of the variety of types of monitors and monitoring structures that have emerged and are emerging, the court-appointed citizens monitoring commission has gained the most attention. A national network of participants in such bodies has developed in the last few years, and the U.S. Congress has taken note of the growth of monitoring activities (Congressional Record, June 26, 1976). The first major national meeting on "Court-Appointed Monitoring Commissions" was held in Columbus, Ohio, in 1977, and attracted persons from 18 states and 26 cities. Significant features of these types of bodies now are summarized from the report of that meeting (Carol, 1977, pp. 2-13).

As part of their desegregation orders, some federal judges have named masters, experts and/or citizen monitoring bodies to oversee implementation of the decree, to receive continuous input on citizens' perceptions, and to coordinate and manage the acquisition and reporting of data on compliance. Judges have appointed commissions ranging from 10 to 50 members, usually representing a broad spectrum of community leadership. Most court-ordered commissions are empowered on a year-to-year basis. Some of the better-known commissions have been established in Boston, Buffalo, Dallas, Dayton, Denver, Dekalb County (Georgia), Detroit, Milwaukee, and Springfield (Illinois). Annual budgets vary from zero to $200,000. Staffing is non-existent in some commissions (they rely on volunteers, university personnel, or

state and federal agency staffs), while others have a full complement of professional and clerical staff.

The expected problems have arisen. Some monitoring commissions have been seen as competition by other citizens groups. Monitoring commissions commonly complain about a lack of clarity about their responsibilities. There are "communications" problems with judges (who may pay little attention to the commission after it is established) and with school officials (who may resent both the extra work often required by school personnel as well as the appearance of another outside political interference in their governance and management of the schools).

The criteria for success of such commissions center around on-time implementation and broad community acceptance of the plan. Perceived success was found to depend on (1) the clarity of the judge's charge and his or her commitment to follow-up, (2) the quality of legal counsel available to the commission, (3) the political and technical skills of the commission members and staff, (4) the attitudes and degree of cooperation from school officials, and (5) the degree of acceptance of the commission and its activities by the wider community.

The number of formal monitoring bodies -- both court-appointed and with different bases -- is expected to continue to grow. A framework for understanding these activities is developed in the next section.

III. MONITORING AS INTERVENTION: A TYPOLOGY AND DISCUSSION

Increasing intensity of monitoring activity and the progressive institutionalization of the role of monitor both seem to accompany the school desegregation process as it proceeds from Debate and Decision to Planning and, finally, to the Implementation stage. In this section, the development of monitoring as a type of conflict intervention is traced from its place in the routine internal operations of the school system to the emphasis on external surveillance and accountability that develops when school desegregation becomes an issue. The forms of monitoring that emerge then are cast in a typology in terms of their base and credibility, skills required, and typical activities.

A. Routine Monitoring in the School System

Monitoring routinely takes place in the schools. School districts monitor the academic progress of their students and the strength of their curricula through the use of standardized tests. Parents with school age children and other persons interested in public education normally keep abreast of school programs and discuss the activities of school staff and administrators with one another. State and federal officials responsible for funding certain school programs or overseeing policies require reports from school administrators regarding educational matters under their jurisdiction.

School personnel are accustomed to the monitoring of educational programs, then, and to receiving and using the information about their problems and successes generated by monitoring.

These usual forms of monitoring generally do not present school officials with overwhelming or unanticipated problems, because the administrators can either determine what information is to be shared beyond the system or control the access of different parties to the information being requested. In each instance of monitoring, an implicit or explicit evaluation of school policies and personnel is being made, but the school district is largely in control of the evaluation process -- either directly through the selection of consultants and the mode of evaluation, or indirectly through its ongoing relationship with public officials and limitations placed upon the evaluators by time and the law (Englert et al., 1977). The political implications of external monitoring and evaluation of school programs are clear to the school officials whose professional reputations may be at stake because of a negative evaluation they, their program, or their staff may receive.

B. Desegregation and New Monitoring Activities

The established relations between school officials and the various parties who observe and report on educational practices often undergo change with the advent of desegregation. Not only are there demands for more information about the schools, but new questions are asked (often requiring officials to produce novel data) and new groups solicit information about school procedures and programs. The public schools' business becomes much more public, and information control by the district becomes much more difficult. In this context monitoring, regardless of the form it takes, can become an intervention strategy

in its own right: the presence of non-school personnel reviewing the conduct of school staff on a daily basis with the responsibility to report the progress of desegregation to powerful authorities like the courts can influence the behavior of school employees. Thus the issue of <u>who oversees the planning and implementation of desegregation programs</u> may be as important to school officials as what kind of desegregation policies are enacted. The importance of this issue is especially apparent when court-appointed monitoring commissions are present in the school district.

C. <u>A Typology of Monitoring: Base and Credibility, Skills, Typical Activities</u>

Table 1 summarizes important characteristics of the different types of monitoring bodies: the advantages and disadvantages of the base, skills, and typical activities of each type. This framework has been developed from the observation of monitoring activities reported in section IV and from a review of the growing literature on school desegregation monitoring (Stevens and Hunter 1976, National Conference of Christians and Jews 1976, Carol 1977, Dayton Citizens Advisory Board 1977, Racism and Sexism Resource Center for Educators 1977, Sussman 1977). The description of monitoring activities in section IV is built around this typology.

*Table 1 here

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TABLE 1

MONITORING AS INTERVENTION

Type of Monitor: School System Personnel or Party Paid by School System

	Advantages	Disadvantages
Base:	Generally have the trust of school employees and are controlled by district officials. Can better mobilize the school system's resources in behalf of or against desegregation efforts.	Can be too closely identified with school policies and officials to be credible with the community. May be reticent to call for fundamental changes in school policies, or to mobilize resources that might threaten their superiors.
Skills:	Working knowledge of the schools, political alliances, and educational policies.	May be too close to school practices to recognize incipient problems. Their approach to conflict resolution is limited by their base as advocates for the system.
Typical Activities:	Collect data on racial percentages, achievement scores, distribution of staff, and fiscal resources. Issue reports on programs mandated by the courts.	Information about district problems may be guarded. Data requested by the courts or federal agencies can be selectively gathered and reported.

TABLE 1

MONITORING AS INTERVENTION

Type of Monitor: Citizens' Groups, Either Appointed or Elected

	Advantages	Disadvantages
Base:	Can enjoy strong community support. Can be identified as credible representatives by the authorities. Their grass roots network can mobilize efforts for or against desegregation programs.	May be composed of hand-picked supporters of the school system, or people with little support among critics of school practices. May not have or even seek grass roots support for their actions. Generally dependent on school officials to enact their suggestions.
Skills:	Can be essential in securing federal funds for school programs. Can obtain excellent information on how schools are meeting the educational needs of children and obligations imposed by desegregation. Can funnel complaints and information about desegregation from the community to the district.	May not exercise their ability to influence the access of schools to government funds. Can act as a buffer, protecting school officials from criticism. May not inform citizens of school policies. Do not have the technical skills to manage schools or the support of school personnel to carry out their ideas.

TABLE 1

MONITORING AS INTERVENTION

Type of Monitor: Citizens' Groups, Either Appointed or Elected (cont.)

	Advantages	Disadvantages
Typical Activities:	Oversee desegregation activities and report to the public and authorities. Hold community meetings. Can conduct some types of training related to monitoring school programs.	May not have complete access to information needed to complete their monitoring activities. May avoid public meetings and training functions to keep access to schools.

TABLE 1

MONITORING AS INTERVENTION

Type of Monitor: Federal and State Agencies

	Advantages	Disadvantages
Base:	Have the authority to intervene in school programs as plaintiffs, technical assistants or funding agents for desegregation-related activities.	Have a variety of tasks to perform in many communities, and cannot devote extensive intervention to any one community. Usually are not located in the community where their efforts are being felt.
Skills:	Can bring a variety of legal, monetary and technical resources to bear upon desegregation-related problems.	Their information generally is not up-to-date or independently collected. Their influence is subject to court rulings and the vagaries of federal politics.
Typical Activities:	Solicit reports on school programs. Can make site visits, or withhold funds.	The information they receive often is not verified. Are not likely to withhold or withdraw funds, even when violations are proven, because of political considerations.

TABLE 1

MONITORING AS INTERVENTION

Type of Monitor: Independent Organizations

	Advantages	Disadvantages
Base:	Identified as experts in their fields. Can be independent of all parties and, thus, not viewed as biased for or against the school system or community.	Unless appointed by the judge, they have only their status as experts in some aspect of desegregation to enhance their influence. Have no power or natural constituence in the district. May be identified as an advocate by either the school system or community.
Skills:	May have a variety of technical skills and resources at their disposal. May be useful as observers and analysts of school problems. May have practical experience in conflict resolution and mediation.	May get no assistance from school officials to help remedy identified problems. They may be distrusted because of their expertise and outside base.

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TABLE 1

MONITORING AS INTERVENTION

Type of Monitor: Independent Organizations (cont.)

	Advantages	Disadvantages
Typical Activities:	Collect sophisticated research data. Can speak with staff, students and community to identify problems. Can train all parties on problem identification and prevention. Can provide information and requests to intervene to federal and state officials.	Access to school staff and other sources of information about the schools may be limited. Data collected for academic purposes may not be useful in the immediate situation.

* * *

At this early stage in the development of monitoring as a special field, the issues and problems surrounding effective monitoring of school desegregation are numerous and complex. No single party has a complete view of the desegregation process, nor a monopoly on the truth. Each has its own peculiar strengths and weaknesses, and their skills can complement one another.

Our preliminary analysis leads to the conclusion that a comprehensive and accurate monitoring effort would require all four types of monitors -- school, citizen, public agency, and independently-based -- to work together in a district. But given their varying interests and constituencies, the problems of coordination are great, and they may work at cross purposes, or against one another. One result, as the next section of this paper reveals, can be a fragmentary and heavily contested view of desegregation.

IV. AN ANALYSIS OF MONITORING ACTIVITIES IN TWO SCHOOL DISTRICTS

These perspectives now are applied to monitoring activities in two school districts in the St. Louis area -- the City of St. Louis Public Schools and the Ferguson-Florissant Reorganized School District in St. Louis County. The period of the analysis roughly corresponds to the three-year National Institute of Education contract under which the authors and their staff worked in the two districts from mid-1976 to mid-1979.

A. Background on School Desegregation in St. Louis and Ferguson-Florissant

The public schools in the City of St. Louis had a 1979-80 enrollment of approximately 66,000 students -- down from a peak of 116,000 in 1961. Like the public schools in most older northern and border cities, the percentage of non-white students has steadily increased from 37 percent in 1953, to approximately 50 percent in 1960, and nearly 75 percent in 1979.

The Ferguson-Florissant Reorganized (R-2) District encompasses parts of a number of municipalities in north St. Louis County. In a comparable time period, the predominantly white, former Ferguson-Florissant District grew rapidly until its peak student census of 20,000 in 1968, then had declined to 15,000 in 1975 before the merger, which brought in two new districts including the all-black Kinloch District and brought the total back to more than 19,000 students. In 1979, the still declining total enrollment of the new R-2 District stood again at approximately 15,000.

The two school systems -- one a central city district in an old city rapidly losing population (from 780,000 in 1950 to an estimated 500,000 or less in 1980) and the other a recently-merged district in an older area of the surrounding county -- have been at different stages of the desegregation process during the study period.

A desegregation suit against the Board of Education in the City of St. Louis has been in the courts since 1972. In April 1979, the District court ruled that the school system had not

intentionally caused segregation. The ruling was still under appeal late in 1979. The case involves eight different parties, ranging from black and white parents groups to the city, the state, the U.S. Department of Justice, and the NAACP (both the local branch and the national organization).

A consent decree signed late in 1975 failed to contribute significantly to the desegregation of the system. The same was true for a small magnet school program that resulted from that decree, which has enrolled only several thousand students and has been constantly embroiled in disputes about a permissive transfer policy that enables children to attend schools -- including the magnet schools -- outside of their appointed area.

As the legal complexion of the case has changed, so has the political situation in the city. A number of efforts have been made to draw community leaders into the desegregation process and to help citizens articulate their concerns regarding school desegregation. Predominantly white groups have taken a public stance of support for the general idea of non-discriminatory school programs, while opposing compulsory busing in order to achieve them. The black Concerned Parents of North St. Louis group (which filed the original suit in 1972) has been involved in conversations with predominantely white Southside groups. The St. Louis-based Danforth Foundation and the regional office of the National Conference of Christians and Jews have led efforts to build a community-wide coalition for peaceful and orderly school desegregation. With the legal issues still under appeal, the school system is taking few steps regarding further planning related specifically to these issues.

In September 1976 the Ferguson-Florissant R-2 District began its first year of classroom desegregation. The administrations and staffs of the formerly independent Ferguson-Florissant, Berkeley, and Kinloch districts had been merged on July 1, 1975. The school district of Kinloch, consisting of a small and entirely black community, had been gerrymandered into existence earlier in this century. While both the merger and initial year of desegregation met with some resistance, there were no major outbreaks of violence as had been feared. New busing and pupil assignment plans were approved by the court in the second and third years to help reduce some of the black enrollment in Berkeley schools. The same judge sitting in the St. Louis case plans to end the court's jurisdiction over the district soon, despite complaints from some Berkeley and Kinloch residents.

The judge's desire to withdraw from the suburban case and his record of inviting additional parties into the city case who might extend any legal ruling for years through appeals, revealed readiness on his part to submit future decisions regarding desegregation to the political vagaries of both districts. It also may reflect his recognition that no court is capable of resolving the thorny political problems generated by school desegregation. In any case, it is evident that political considerations will continue to play a large role in the desegregation process in these two districts.

B. School Desegregation and Monitoring in the City of St. Louis[6]

The City's magnet school program and the continued debate about desegregation in the courts and in the press have received

more scrutiny by all segments of the community and the federal government than the smaller suburban district's desegregation order and plan. The greater attention paid to the City's schools since the raising of the desegregation issue in the courts in 1972 has not yet produced a clear and widely accepted picture of the system's situation and problems. Observers of the school system would agree only in the broadest terms that the district (s) is losing enrollment, (2) has an inadequate tax base, (3) has approximately a 75-25 non-white to white pupil ratio, (4) has a teaching staff that has shown resistance to attempts to improve racial balance among staffs at the individual school level, (5) is self-conscious about its image and desires to improve, and (6) is have serious problems in producing "basic academic achievement" (the major stated priority of the Board of Education) at levels acceptable to its patrons.

Each of the four types of monitoring described in section III is present in the St. Louis situation; none of the monitoring is court-ordered. Among the monitors are:

The School System. An evaluation department is responsible for collecting various types of data described below. In the summer of 1979 the district hired an "Advisory Specialist on Desegregation" to collect data and report problems to the superintendent, utilizing funds obtained under Title IV of the Emergency School Assistance Act (ESAA).

Government Agencies. The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare has continuously monitored the racial composition and distribution of

students and teaching staffs, as well as the operation of certain HEW-funded programs.

Citizens Groups. Three types of citizens groups of varying composition and influence have been involved in monitoring the St. Louis system: the Citizens Education Task Force (CETF), the ESAA Citywide Advisory Committee, and Parent Advisory Committee (PAC's) related to each of the magnet locations and some additional schools.

Independent Organizations. Researchers from St. Louis area colleges and universities have been peripherally-involved in monitoring, as have some of the staff members of the Danforth Foundation and the National Conference of Christians and Jews.

The role of each of these types of monitors in the St. Louis system now is examined.

1. School System.

The City of St. Louis public school system has its own small evaluation department, which is responsible for collecting and analyzing information about educational offerings in city schools. Among its other tasks, departmental staff have acquired data on the progress of students in the magnet school program and the satisfaction of persons with that program. Senior magnet school staff were concerned from the inception of the program that data gathered by the evaluation team could be used against them. Throughout the entire first year of the Magnet School program in 1976-77, there were many charges leveled from within the school system at the staff, its specialized curriculum, and recruitment practices. Magnet schools were

charged with causing shortages in supplies (magnet schools also were short of supplies), taking the best students (some magnet school staff felt they had received many of the system's problem students), and depleting non-magnet schools of some of their best teachers (staff for the first year were selected from a pool of volunteers from across the district -- mainly teachers at magnet sites who did not want to leave their schools). Magnet school staff members were upset about these charges, but could do little to stop the persistent rumors regarding their program.

The magnet schools -- several thousand students in 10 special-emphasis schools such as mathematics and performing arts -- were supported during their first year (1976-77) school year largely by federal HEW funds -- some 85 percent of the cost. Notification of funding for the first year came in August only weeks before the magnet schools were to open their doors for the first time. From the beginning, their operation has been under close scrutiny from the Office of Civil Rights in HEW because of their inability to attract and hold enough white students to make up the minimum 30 percent of the student bodies as mandated by HEW. The external funding situation has remained on this same uncertain basis for each year of the program, although federal funds now comprise only about one-third of the cost of operating the magnet schools.

The discussions continue within the school system -- about the viability of the magnet school concept, about the prospective "drain" of good students from neighborhood schools, and about the small number of students involved (approximately 4,000 in the 1979-80 school year). The incidences of missed communications and mistrust between the magnet schools and the evaluation department staff reflect the ultimately political nature of monitoring, even when it is conducted strictly within the school system.

2. Federal Agencies.

The federal government also is involved in the monitoring of the magnet school program, but its interest differs from that of the school system's own evaluators. The Office of Civil Rights of HEW has paid special attention to the system's permissive transfer policy which has enabled students to attend schools outside of their assigned areas. The policy was criticized before the first year of the magnet school program, but the school system won a one-year delay in altering the guidelines for student transfers. The issue was raised again before the second year of the program, but this time funds for the magnet schools were withheld until modifications in the permissive transfer policy were enacted. As a result of these changes, some students had to return to their regularly assigned schools and others who only recently had applied for admission into a magnet school had to be turned away.

OCR's monitoring effort, while marked by insistence that the permissive transfer policy facilitated the maintenance of a dual school system in St. Louis and had to be changed, has recognized some important political realities in St. Louis. Foremost in the minds of local school officials and federal representatives was the need to attract and hold white students in the public school system. Thus, when the parents of several white children scheduled to return to their regular schools complained and received considerable attention from the media, both OCR and school officials permitted them to stay in their magnet school. In addition, neither federal nor local officials have been quick to point out that the magnet schools are not a radical departure from the old system of neighborhood schools which still is being contested in the courts.

Magnet schools are designed to provide an alternative to compulsory busing by attracting students of all races to an excellent program. But the majority of black children attending magnet schools have been bused in.

All in all, many white and black parents whose children attend magnet schools have been pleased with the program, although some children have been withdrawn because of bus transportation problems. The school system continues to balance

such crucial local considerations as client satisfaction with the challenges of federal monitors who carry enforcement power to promote or end this and other programs.

3. Citizens Groups.

Desegregation also creates new opportunities for parental and citizen involvement in the schools. In St. Louis there have been three different types of groups overseeing the desegregation process and trying to serve as liaisons between the school system and community -- the Citizens Education Task Force (CETF, an umbrella group of citizens including members from St. Louis County as well as the City), the Parent Advisory Committees of individual schools in the system (PAC's), and the ESAA City-wide Advisory Committee (CAC).

The Citizens Education Task Force, created jointly by the St. Louis Board of Education and the St. Louis Board of Aldermen, began operation in 1976 and has entered a period of reassessment in the Fall of 1979 due to declining fiscal support -- but with hopes expressed for new funding. Funded predominantly by the Danforth Foundation (up to two-thirds in one year) and corporate contributions from 1976 to 1979, the CETF was charged with achieving eight objectives related to improving (1) student learning outcomes, (2) management, (3) school/community and public/private education linkages, (4) financing, (5) citizen participation, (6) community support for the schools, (7) inter-group relations (cited specifically in the charge were "tensions" which exist in the community as a result of differences

in religious, cultural, racial and economic backgrounds), and (8) staff relations. The Task Force synthesized these eight objectives in "two primary goals": "increasing public confidence in the schools" and "seeking ways to improve educational outcomes" (Wright, et al, 1979, pp. 3, 14).

While none of these goals calls for monitoring per se, the 38 members of the CETF and their small executive staff (a director, associate director, and clerical staff, with an annual budget ranging between $100,000 and $200,000) immediately began organizing and collecting data required to develop strategies and recommendations. In the course of these activities, the CETF played the expected Researcher's role, but also appeared to many as a strong Advocate -- for citizen influence in the school system, for a more open process of governance and broader sharing of information by the school system, and for broader community support of the public schools.

The CETF conducted a wide range of advocacy activities despite the fact that its members never fully resolved a number of internal issues regarding their appropriate role. The major unresolved question during its three years of heavily-funded activities is a typical problem for all monitoring and quasi-monitoring bodies: what shall be the relationship to the school system? Many members felt that the fiscal sponsors of the Task Force wanted it to supply community support for the new superintendent and two of his major goals for the system -- administrative reorganization (in a top-heavy structure with a decreasing student census) and a greater focus on site management. The

CETF's Executive Director for 1977-79 described the split on the Task Force as between those who wanted to "talk out" their differences with the system and those who wanted to "confront" the system. Especially those in the second group said they "coundl not trust the school system", and persons in both factions used words like "watchdog" and "oversee" in describing the Task Force's role.

There have been other significant cleavages in the organization that have persisted since its inception: City vs. County, upper vs. lower social class, old/young, persons with children in the system vs. those without, pro-desegregation vs. anti-desegregation, etc. The Task Force has been interracial, but race per se seldom became a primary basis of internal cleavages. In a statement which illustrates the built-in structural problems of such a broad-based organization, a young, blue-collar mother with children in the system said of an older, upper middle class woman who resides in the County -- with much feeling and just enough humor -- "If she calls me 'My dear' once more, I'll punch her in the mouth." Both were white.

The CETF's activities have covered the entire range of what monitors generally do:

-- Conducted intensive studies of the system and produced a series of recommendations to the school system on issues ranging from the impact of redevelopment on public schools, to better public information, to creation of a special citywide vocational education district.

(The recommendations are in varying stages of study and/or implementation by the school system.)

-- Formally petitioned the school system to begin a community-based process, involving the CETF, to develop plans for quality integrated education before final legal appeals are resolved, as suggested by the Court. (The system has not done so.)

-- Published a monthly newsletter, The Monitor, which covered court proceedings, test scores, legal rights of parents, etc.

-- Formally petitioned the judge in the school desegregation case to designate the CETF to serve as the monitoring body during the Planning and Implementation stages. (The judge responded that he would make no such designation until and unless violation were determined.)

-- Sponsored television programs on school desegregation, including a three-hour expert panel/audience participation/call-in format which drew the largest Nielsen rating of viewers in the 25-year history of public television in St. Louis.

-- Sponsored a series of city-wide and neighborhood community forums on "Understanding Desegregation Processes" with a grant from the Missouri Committee for the Humanities, which varied in attendance from 15 to 600.

-- Sponsored a series of bus tours of the entire district for PAC presidents and a number of informal meetings for

parents across racial and georgraphical lines -- both of which were well attended and positively evaluated by the participants.

-- Petitioned the judge to enter a teacher/school board contract dispute in 1979 as a mediator; CETF officials believe their proposed intervention helped shorten the strike by promoting the joint negotiations of the parties.

In summary, the CETF had many of the characteristics of a citizens monitoring group. It was, in our judgment, successful in the specific public education programs it undertook, in raising to the school system and the community at-large a number of problems and recommendations which must be addressed by both the system and the city if the schools are to thrive, and in advancing the legitimacy of citizen/parent participation in all facets of school system operations. It has been less successful in determining a focus for its role, in gaining community support for its efforts and for the school system, in gaining support for its recommendations with the school board or any direct influence on the court -- and in its various monitoring activities.

The Parent Advisory Committees could provide some needed support for monitoring activities. The PAC's of magnet schools already were conducting unsystematic monitoring of the desegregation effort represented by each of their schools. The degree to which they have become involved depends almost exclusively upon the parents, because while magnet school officials

have made a strong public commitment to consulting parents, principals have used or ignored these groups at will. Some groups of parents have assisted in the drawing up of behavioral and dress codes for their children, and others have offered advice on a wide range of issues to their children's principals. A large share of parents have assumed the more traditional role of receiving information rather than collecting and acting on it.

There are many areas where participation could be increased Some of the most involved parents are those whose children already were attending that particular school before it became a magnet school, and there remains a problem of how to include parents in PAC activities who live long distances from their children's magnet school. Many black parents find it especially difficult to go to evening meetings far from their homes. This problem will have to be overcome if black parents are to contribute to a monitoring effort in their children's schools.[7]

A final source of citizen influence in the city's desegregation process had been through the ESAA Citywide Advisory Committee. It was established so the school system could qualify for Emergency School Aid Act funds which support much of the magnet school program. The ESAA Citywide Advisory Committee is composed of persons from throughout the city, but they have not been as closely identified with the city's educational and political leadership as are those on the CETF. Members of the ESAA committee have been more willing to challenge district policies.

One notable example came during the planning for the magnet schools' first year. A good deal of money had been proposed for "environmental stress" retreats where students could work on common problems and crises in an outdoor setting and, presumably, begin to overcome any prejudicial tendencies on their part. Parents reviewing the proposal objected strongly to the expense of the program, and argued that white and black children already had opportunities to go on field trips together and could go on more of them for far less money than was being proposed. They wrote a letter to HEW and were able to deny funding to that portion of the grant proposal.

The entire ESAA committee was able to review only the initial draft of the proposal to HEW for the second year of funds for the magnet schools. Subsequent drafts never were approved by the committee as a whole. A similar situation has arisen in relation to the selection of staff for the magnet schools. The ESAA committee participated in the hiring process prior to the first year of the program, but was not consulted on staff selection before the second year. This led to some disenchantment among parents who had helped screening of applicants the first year.

So, lack of district-wide organization, skills, and training hampered the effectiveness of the ESAA Committee in its para-monitoring activities.

4. Independent Organizations.

All of the problems in monitoring a desegregation process cited above are magnified when considering the role of the independent researcher as a potential monitor. Without a natural constituency except their fellow professional educators and without any formal power, independent researchers probably cannot be of substantial help to harried school officials and committed parent groups unless they are willing to bend their research interests to the advocacy goals these interest groups represent. Further, researchers may embarrass officials in technical reports and articles. Some school officials thus may try to ignore researchers if they can, and work with them when they must.

In the City school district, the political loyalties of the field staff involved in the UMSL project were suspected by magnet school officials until the project staff issued a confidential report which highlighted many of the political problems the magnet schools were experiencing. After that, relations grew more cordial. During the second year of the magnet school program, project staff worked much more closely with several of the schools in the program, and tried to make known the lessons that could be learned from the magnet school experience and applied throughout the district should a comprehensive desegregation plan be enacted.

Project staff also have spent a good deal of time observing the maneuvering in and outside of the court which may lead to such a desegregation plan, and in producing two major reports

summarizing the proceedings and making recommendations on a procedure for achieving a mediated desegregation plan. This activity has gained legitimacy for the project as a source of credible information -- and, therefore, some degree of influence. In addition, the senior author was selected by the administration to serve as facilitator for the ongoing staff seminar for the superintendent and his top 25 staff.[8]

Foundation officials and researchers from other area universities also represent this category of monitoring. The activities of the Danforth Foundation and the National Conference of Christians and Jews have been described, with their sponsorship of the Interrim Citizens Steering Committee and the Interfaith Clergy Council both laying the groundwork from potential citizen monitoring in the future.

Researchers from other universities have been involved -- as consultants to the various parties (two from the same department at Washington University have gone different routes, one in drawing up the desegregation plan presented to the court by the black parents group, and the other as a full-time consultant to the superintendent to develop closer linkages between the schools and other institutions), as providers of demographic data to all parties (St. Louis University), as "academic humanists" on the various programs sponsored by the CETF and other groups with Missouri Humanities money, and as evaluators of various school and community programs (including the CETF's workshops and forums). Of all this involvement, the most sustained has been that of the University of Missouri-

St. Louis project staff in monitoring court proceedings and developing reports which summarize the situation and make recommendations.

Together, the foundation representatives and academic researchers in St. Louis form an extensive network both within and outside of the schools, and their information -- if pooled and systematized -- would afford a comprehensive picture of desegregation which no single party has available to it.

* * *

In summary, an examination of various monitoring and monitoring-related activities regarding the St. Louis public schools yields a picture of involvement of all four types of monitors, no court support for monitoring at this point while the desegregation case still is in the appeals stage, relatively little coordination among the various bodies conducting monitoring, and little demonstrated success in relating information discovered and strategies recommended to action on the part of the school system.

It may be concluded, however, that important organizational and technical groundwork has been laid for effective monitoring should a school desegregation plan become a reality -- and especially if the court mandates monitoring.

C. School Desegregation and Monitoring in the Ferguson-Florissant School District

Unlike the City's school system, the Ferguson-Florissant Reorganized School District has no formal evaluation department. Also unlike the City, the suburban district has been the site of

activity of a court-ordered "monitoring" committee -- the Bi-Racial Advisory Council established by the judge when the districts were ordered merged and desegregated in 1975. But, like the City monitoring activities in the Ferguson-Florissant district have been fragmented and have made virtually no visible impact on the operations of the school system.

1. School System.

Monitoring of school programs, academic achievement, and student/teacher relations by the district is conducted under the auspices of one or more of the several assistant superintendents in the district. The merger and desegregation process have expanded the types and amount of information collected, but apparently not the process through which it is gathered. Nor does it seem that information about problems occurring in the schools has been systematically analyzed and acted upon. Funds had been designated to hire an evaluator for programs introduced into the schools because of the

desegregation process, but that position was deleted from the budget shortly before classroom desegregation began in the fall of 1976, reportedly following a discussion with U.S. Justice Department officials.

The absence of a complete monitoring of each program's successes and failures is reflected in the required report submitted by the district to the federal agencies and the court. The formal reports describe the goals and types of activities called for under different parts of the desegregation program, but there is no assessment of their effectiveness. There has been a wide range of discretion exercised by school officials in the expenditure of desegregation-related funds. Community meetings to facilitate the desegregation process are listed in the reports without indications of the issues raised, recommendations made, or actions taken.

Such reports were prepared by the administration and transmitted to the judge and the Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice twice a year for the first few years following the desegregation and merger order of 1975. Now the reports are filed once a year, and the district is asking the court to be released from its jurisdiction. School officials have contended in the reports, in meetings of citizens and colleagues, and in the media, that desegregation in the district is proceeding smoothly. The court and the federal agencies have accepted this interpretation, although groups of black parents (and on at least one occasion a group of black students)

have presented problems regarding the treatment of minority students to the district administrators, the school board, and the judge. In each case, no action has been forthcoming, and in some cases the complainants have been citicized for complaining.

2. Government Agencies.

The Civil Rights Division of the U.S. Department of Justice was a plaintiff in the suit against the district that resulted in the merger and desegregation order. The Community Relations Service (CRS) -- a racial conciliation agency also in the Department of Justice but without litigative or enforcement powers -- helped draw up the desegregation order and develop plans for its implementation. The Missouri State Commission on Education also was instrumental in the final plan which emerged and in preparations for implementation.

None of these agencies has engaged in systematic monitoring activities during implementation of the desegregation plan, even though substantial changes have been made from the original plan, including the closing of two relatively new all-black schools and the elimination of virtually all cross-busing (leaving the major impact of busing on black children).

The Civil Rights Division -- faced with dozens of open desegregation cases at all times -- has never formally monitored or even systematically investigated the implementation of the plan it won in legal proceedings. The attorney in charge has maintained liaison with the assistant to the superintendent in the district, generally on the telephone and in informal

meetings in Washington, but only infrequently on site in the district. In the second year of classroom desegregation the Civil Rights Division was reported to have conducted an informal telephone survey of 100 black families in Kinloch regarding their opinions of the desegregation process to date. Inbestigations by the UMSL project staff, public officials in Kinloch, the Community Relations Service, and a black district administrator yielded no one who had been part of the sample. The results -- which were said to give the district a "clean bill of health" -- were never released.

A CRS staff person inquiring about alleged problems in the district was told by the district that the survey indicated there were no basic problems. Both the CRS official and the Civil Rights Division lawyer alleged to have conducted the survey agreed that desegregation implementation had not been monitored thoroughly, adding that they are powerless to conduct adequate monitoring in the absence of a dramatic indication (mass protests or disorders, it is to be assumed) that the process is not working.

A further complication in many districts desegregating under court order is present in this case. Public agencies with special skills in monitoring and community relations -- like the CRS and state and local human relations commissions -- may be unable to establish a base for monitoring if the court or the Civil Rights Division continues to claim authority over the district. Here, as with a number of issues, the owners of the litigation process often prevent incursions in to their presumed

jurisdictions by bodies better prepared for the myriad of non-litigative activities which contribute to the formation and implementation of social policy.

3. Citizen Groups.

As in other desegregating districts, some citizens who are concerned about the problems their children have faced in the report a sense of powerlessness. Reported difficulties often are treated by school administrators as unusual incidents or aberrant behavior -- rather than representing a pattern of problems to which systemic solutions can be addressed. This is especially clear in the case of black parents and students with problems, but also applies to some white parents and children.

In Ferguson-Florissant, complaints from black parents and students during the first few years of desegregation were referred to a black staff member who is a long-time Kinloch resident and former employee of the old Kinloch school system. Very few complaints moved beyond her office, although alleged problems continue to accumulate. She recently has been retired.

Complaints continue to emerge. In the fall of 1979 a group of Kinloch citizens is charging physical abuse of black students, the continuation of differential rates of suspension and explusion by race,[9] differential placement of students in non-academic courses by race, and discriminatory treatment of black staff. There appears to be no body or process in the district capable of receiving, investigating, analyzing, and recommending

(or actually delivering) a response. The citizens have written to the judge regarding many of these issues, and two former Kinloch administrators have filed suit against the district regarding the discrimination changes.[10]

The court-ordered Bi-Racial Advisory Council mentioned at the beginning of this section was intended to be such a body -- by the CRS and the State Department of Education, if not the judge. The court created the Council from the board members of the old Berkeley and Kinloch districts who did not become members of the new R-2 board (only one board member from each district was added to the old Ferguson-Florissant board after the merger). According to a district official, there was no direct communication with the judge, no budget, no staff, and a vague mandate. Questions and problems were submitted by the Council to the district administration, but there was no mechanism for follow-up. Sometimes only three or four of the 18 members of the Council attended meetings, and it was discontinued in the fall of 1977 -- one year after classroom desegregation began.

A major reason for the ineffectiveness of the Bi-Racial Advisory Council as a monitor by now is familiar: it had no way of developing information independent of the district administration. Without independent information, staff, budget, specific mandate, or a close relationship with the judge (or a federal enforcement agency), citizens groups have no power base from which to negotiate their interests vis-à-vis district officials. Lack of daily access to decision-making channels is another

problem. A case in point involves the time the Council voted against the administration's recommendation to close several schools, but the schools were closed based on the system's view that certain technical problems (such as the condition of the heating equipment) made it financially impossible to keep them open.[11]

4. Independent Organizations.

The independent researcher in such a setting is without a firm base. Staff of the UMSL project learned this almost immediately after completing a needs assessment in several schools during the fall of 1976 when classroom desegregation began. Many administrators expressed surprise that problems had

been identified and that their policies were seen as contributing to those problems, and each incident tended to be defined as isolated and unusual. Access to the schools has been difficult since then, but project staff have maintained a network and an interest in the situation in the district, including contacts with top administrators, staff, parents, and agency personnel concerned with the district. Lacking a mandate or a base for formal monitoring, any impact will be the result of informal influence networks.

* * *

The picture of monitoring that emerges in these two desegregating school districts, then, is one of fragmentation, problems of base and role-definition, and continued maintenance of control of the process by school district officials. Without active and accurate monitoring, it is difficult for desegregation plans to be intelligently amended as problems arise during implementation -- or, as in the case of the St. Louis public schools, for interest groups outside the school system to gain sufficient input into the formulation and planning processes for any plan to receive wide community acceptance.

In these two school districts, attempts at outside influence, oversight, and/or formal monitoring have not been very effective (Monti, 1979b). This continuation of unilateral control by school administrators and board (whose major responsibilities include organizational maintenance of the school system) suggests that the chances for success of educational reforms like desegregation will continue to be low.

V. IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL POLICY AND INTERVENTION STRATEGIES

The activities of the school desegregation monitor have been analyzed in this paper as an emerging social role and as a form of community conflict intervention. Four basic types of monitoring were identified in the light of the base of the activity -- within the school system, citizens groups, government agencies, and independent organizations. An examination of monitoring activities in two St. Louis-area school districts at different stages of the desegregation process revealed the existence of all four types of monitors in at least a latent form, and indicated that monitoring efforts had not been very effective in reaching the goals (1) of gaining access to the school system as well as to independent sources of data on which to base recommendations, (2) of providing a systematic reporting and evaluation of the degree to which school system actions are meeting standards established by the court or other authorizing body, or (3) of facilitating changes in the actions of the system to conform more closely with those standards.

There are many implications of this analysis for both school desegregation policies and monitoring intervention strategies, which can be understood only in the light of certain assumptions noted below.

1. Conflict regarding school desegregation will continue at a high level throughout the United States for some years to come -- in the courts, across racial and class lines, between professional groups (teachers vis-à-vis administrators, for

example), and among parents and the other patrons of the public schools.

2. As with all public service delivery system, the operation of the public schools is first and always a political activity -- involving the struggle of the various interest groups involved (board, administration, teachers, staff, parents, students, public agencies, community leaders, the courts, etc.) for control of the process of allocating scarce educational resources.

3. Monitoring is essential if the desegregation effort is to be orderly and produce outcomes acceptable to the courts as well as to the community and the school system.

4. As with every other social role, the monitor represents an interest group in the process of desegregation, so it is inappropriate to regard monitoring as a "neutral" activity. In terms of the intervention role typology presented, monitoring is a mix of Research, Advocacy, Mediation -- and sometimes Enforcement.

Among the most important implications for social policy and social intervention are the following:

1. <u>If quality integrated education with a high degree of citizen involvement is a desired outcome of the desegregation process, then the operation of a combination of monitors is essential at all stages -- Decision, Planning, and Implementation</u>. A broadly representative citizens monitoring group, authorized and empowered by the court, should be at the heart of the activities in those situations where a desegregation

plan has been ordered by the court. Experience in St. Louis and in other cities indicates that, to be able to effectively fulfill its role obligations, such a committee or commission should meet the following criteria, in addition to broad representation:

-- Have a clear mandate and specific authority from the court.

-- Have complete access to the school system, guaranteed by the court if necessary.

-- Have a professional staff and adequate operating budget, with periodic training for staff.

-- Conduct its operations openly and share information readily.

-- Report often -- in clear, direct language -- to the court, the school system, and the community.

-- Concentrate on follow-up and implementation of the recommendations it offers.

2. Monitoring of school desegregation should be conducted from a variety of bases in addition to the broad-based citizens group described above. If accountability for actions and expenditures is to be forthcoming, it is imperative that each of the interest groups have the ability to look after its own interests. The involvement of the school system, government agencies invested in the schools, and independent organizations all can contribute the variety of bases and interests which insure that no one group will capture the process solely for its own purposes.

3. Increasingly the courts are intervening into the programs of public service agencies on behalf of clients, citizens, patients, and students. Desegregation suits in the public schools and legal actions focussing on the conditions of confinement and inmate/patient rights in prisons and mental hospitals are the most typical examples. Administrators, board members, and commissioners frequently have complained that their authority to fulfill their obligations in running the system is being usurped by the courts. Monitoring -- especially citizen monitoring -- can provide a method for helping shift the locus of control of school systems and other agencies back toward the local community, client groups, and institutions. Courts have intervened because of allegations of unfair or inadequate service; administrators and professional staffs in schools (and other institutions) need the continuous input and oversight of their patrons and clients if they are to meet the expressed needs sufficiently to avoid such court action. Returning accountability of local service institutions from the courts to local constituencies is possible with effective monitoring. Without it, school districts may be called back into court for nonperformance of the duties established in a court-ordered desegregation plan (Wright 1979, Monti 1980).

4. Like administrators in most institutions, school administrators tend to view problems or conflicts within their jurisdiction as isolated incidents, aberrant behavior, or "accidents" -- rather than part of a pattern of behavior. In fact, conflicts and problem-presentation are highly patterned. As long as

officials continue to view them as unpatterned and essentially random, no action will be taken toward policy changes that could be responsive to the problems. Monitoring, properly performed, can demonstrate beyond reasonable doubt that expulsion ratios, incidents between students and teachers, parental complaints, and teacher assignments, for example, represent a pattern which can be discovered and, if not addressed, can lead to the problems administrators fear most -- instability and organized noncompliant behavior on the part of the clients and patrons. The major aim of monitoring, in the words of one observer, is "to prevent 'accidents'".

5. The foregoing analysis also holds implications for social scientists and other researchers who operate from an organizational base independent of the school system, the courts, the community, or governmental agencies. The major implication is that independent researchers should recognize that they, too, represent interest groups, and that their activity is not neutral. The various parties at-interest will try to use academic monitors for their own interests. From a perspective of fairness and "evening up the odds," academic monitors could be urged to contribute their skills and the credibility of their organizational base to the parties in the process with the greatest stake and the least formal power -- the parents and students. Most of the other interest groups have the resources to look after their own interests -- the school system, the courts, the governmental agencies, and the corporate community, for example. Academic researchers who choose to assist parents and students in monitoring or

conflict resolution should be prepared to accept the likely consequences of being perceived by the school system as parent and student advocates (Crain 1976).

* * *

Within these parameters, one may predict that the role of the school desegregation monitor will continue to expand and become more clearly defined. One may also predict that as the role becomes more legitimated, the conflict surrounding its articulation will escalate. Social scientists as intervenors can play important roles in constructively dealing with conflicts in school desegregation and other current issues only if they are aware that any such work is a form of intervention, and recognize both the limited potential and the political limits placed on them by their structural base.

FOOTNOTES

[1]Laue was Principal Investigator and Monti Project Director for a National Institute of Education contract (NIE 400-76-0103) from July 1, 1976 to June 30, 1979, entitled "Strategies and Techniques for Crisis Prevention in Local School Systems." In connection with this contract and ongoing work of the Center for Metropolitan Studies at the University of Missouri-St. Louis, they conducted research, engaged in workshops and training activities, and worked with private and public agencies (national as well as local) toward the development of constructive approaches to resolving desegregation-related conflicts in two St. Louis area school districts -- the City of St. Louis and the Ferguson-Florissant R-2 school district. Three Senior Research Analysts made important contributions to development of the data on which this paper is based. They are: Richard Patton, who monitored all court proceedings in the desegregation case in St. Louis and is the primary author of two major policy papers based on that work (see Patton and Laue, Resolving the Desegregation Issue in the St. Louis Public Schools, Parts I and II); Frances Thomas, who did extensive field work, especially in the Ferguson-Florissant District, during the first two years of the project; and Gena Scott, whose field work during the first year of the project was concentrated in the City of St. Louis.

[2]The legal issues usually center on the question of whether school officials have deliberately or intentionally caused racial segregation in the system's schools in violation of the equal protection clause of the 14th amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

[3]Sixteen years of litigation were required in Los Angeles before the legal issues finally were settled.

[4]Organizations currently involved in the practice of community disputes intervention include the Community Relations Service of the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service, the Community Dispute Services section of the American Arbitration Association (Washington), the Institute for Mediation and Conflict Resolution (New York), the Community Conflict Resolution Program (University of Missouri-St. Louis), the Center for Teaching and Research in Disputes Settlement (University of Wisconsin), the Department of Law, Justice and Community Relations of the United Methodist Church (Washington), the Office of Environmental Mediation (University of Washington, Seattle), the Center for Community Justice (Washington -- which works predominantly in the development of grievance procedures in prisons and schools), the Neighborhood Justice Centers in Atlanta, Kansas City, and Los Angeles, and hundreds of recently-formed neighborhood dispute resolution centers based in churches, synagogues, and various public and private service agencies. Three independently-sponsored conferences on community dispute resolution in 1979 in New York, New Jersey, and Kansas City attracted a total of more than 500 persons representing approximately 200 organizations.

[5]This definition draws on Carol, 1977 (p. 3) and the authors' field research.

[6]The data in this section and the following section are drawn from field work in the district conducted under the auspices of Monti, on Laue's interviews with system officials, and on an interview with John Wright, Executive Director of the Citizens Education Task Force from Summer 1977 to Summer 1979.

[7]The former CETF director, who worked closely with the PAC's and helped support their work across school and racial lines, concluded that they "did not have much of a role in monitoring." "Many people didn't know they were

even on the Parent Advisory Committee," he said, "and some PAC's never met. It depended very much on the principals, and some of them did not call the meetings, even though it was mandated by Title I for the magnet schools." In his view, the PAC's "had no effectiveness at all as monitors" (Wright, 1979).

[8]It is important to note that a consulting fee is offered to facilitators in this as well as other staff seminars conducted concurrently, but the senior author has rejected such payment in an effort to maintain greater independence of base.

[9]Suspension rates among black students in at least one school in the district were well over 50 percent in a recent year.

[10]The allegations of discrimination became widely-known late in October 1979 when one of St. Louis' major black newspapers carried as its lead story a description of a wide range of charges by the Concerned Parents of Kinloch against the Ferguson-Florissant district ("Ferguson-Florissant Accused of Bias: 'I Will Go To Jail If They Hurt My Children Again' Parent Says," St. Louis American 51, 33 {October 25, 1979} pp. 1, 14).

[11]Another form of citizen monitoring which offers a variant on the typology involves the mass media. Media representatives have begun to become sensitive to the charges that they sensationalize reporting of actual or potential conflicts such as school desegregation. Yet if they were to extend ongoing in-depth coverage to the entire desegregation process, they could serve a valuable function in providing the background against which more specific monitoring activities can be conducted. In Ferguson-Florissant, it appears that the media tacitly decided to give very little coverage to the district once initial classroom desegregation

was accomplished -- both to avoid sensationalism and because the district is not as central to the life of the metropolitan area as is the St. Louis public school district. As a result, a potentially useful source of monitoring was lost, and problems it might have revealed may not be addressed.

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